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Abstract 
Every day, the world looks on more of security analysis needs that are based on the enormous 
and sensitive information. This datum is shared by different systems around the world, which are 
considered at risk of attack at any time. Many scientists and researchers have brought up another 
cryptographic subject in Quantum Computing that is so-called Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) 
protocol. The first QKD is BB84 that was presented by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 
1984. After that, several protocols were created sequentially with the same or different 
mechanism and with some abilities of these protocols to stand against well-known quantum 
attacks. This paper studies these protocols deeply and compares them to find the strong and weak 
points in each considered protocols. 
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Introduction 
Cryptography has existed for several centuries as complicated algorithms, which are based on 
either exchanging or complicated mathematics functions. Now, the classical cryptography is the 
most used in a security system that depends upon public and private keys, which are initiated 
into difficult algorithms such as RSA, El-Gamal, or SHA. All these scenarios have been proved 
secure, but no longer if the scientists reached to establish quantum computer that will break all 
the previous algorithms just in seconds. Here, many of the computer scientists and physicians 
have been working on how to create a secret key in a quantum system the so-called Quantum 
Key Distribution (QKD). The first QKD protocol was announced in 1984 by Bennett and 
Brassard where this protocol is still the background point to come up with a new quantum 
protocol scheme. After that, several QKD protocols have been approved, some of which are 
protocol schemes that are very interesting and hold sparkling ideas in this field such as B92, 
SARG04, COW, KMB09 and EPR. 
In this paper, we will discuss the most common quantum key distribution protocols and focus on 
the mechanism that is used in each protocol to extract the power and the weaknesses of each 
protocol. 
 Classical Cryptography 
One of the challenges that faces the conventional cryptography is the security system that 
depends on the security of the shared key. Also, the speed of computer developments and its 
algorithms have become a threat to the shared and kept data, which should be secure11. The most 
famous mechanisms in the conventional cryptography are symmetric and asymmetric 
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cryptography that in general deal with several algorithms as a bit (0 or 1) or (true or false). 
Authentication is one of the requirements that should be fulfilled, and the used scheme starts 
mostly from the sender side who has the plaintext needed to be sent to the receiver1. Simply, we 
look at RSA as announced by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman in 1977, which is 
based on factorizing a large number from two prime numbers 18.   
Moreover, El-Gamal’s algorithm is considered an asymmetric key encryption algorithm as 
mentioned in his book 8 where the security in this algorithm depends on the difficulty of 
computing discrete algorithms.  
 
Figure (1). The conventional cryptography scheme. 
Public key cryptography and RSA cryptosystem are called to the conventional cryptography, 
which in basically depends on the mathematical basis of the RSA. As mentioned above, RSA 
solves the communication between Alice and Bob by enciphering a key(public) and then 
deciphering the key (private) into complicated and flipped process 26. This protocol has been 
approved as a secure protocol because Eve has problems computing a huge prime number that 
has been linked between Alice and Bob.   
Quantum Cryptography 
Quantum cryptography is guaranteed by the law of physics that demonstrates by non-cloning 
theory that supports unconditionally the secure key, and detects an eavesdropper over 
communicating quantum channel22. Generally, cryptosystems have been defined in three fields: 
designing cryptographic algorithms, which functionally leads the data to the desired target, 
developing encryption and decryption keys to control the algorithms, and distributes the secret 
key that connects parts of the communications20. This section of the paper will discuss the 
quantum key distribution protocols that have shown innovative ideas in how to create a secure 
mechanism between two parties. 
1. BB84 Protocol 
In 1984, Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard introduced the new QKD protocol that is the so-
called BB84 protocol. The BB84 protocol was designed to work on polarization states, which 
Alice (the sender) transmits randomlly independent photons to Bob (the receiver). Each basis in 
BB84 protocol reflects two values 0 or 1 that should be initiated in superposition2. Also, each 
state is shown in one of the two directions either rectilinear basis or diagonal basis. The 
rectilinear basis is polarized at 0o or 90o, while the diagonal basis is represented at 45o or 135o as 
shown in figure [1].  
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Figure (1) shows the polarization states in BB84. 
BB84 protocol is often established in weakening coherent states in preparation states, which give 
a reasonable chance to be attacked by Photon-Number-Splitting attack(PNS)28. On the other 
hand, BB48’s participants communicate with each other to get a secret key, when they wish to 
obtain the key in absence of Eve. Sending each bit in one of conjugate bases that Eve cannot 
know gives a protection. This protection comes based on the impossibility of measuring the state 
of a quantum system in two conjugate bases simultaneously24. 
The protocol as explained in 4 by Bennett and Brassard is the fundamental in quantum 
cryptography that the protocol highlighted the major ideas to how distributing a secret key. At 
first, Alice establishes creating random bits and then passes the desired bits into a quantum 
device to convert the bits to qubits. The qubit as mentioned by Noson S. Yanofsky and Mirco A. 
Mannucci in 27 is represented as a matrix, one column and two rows. This matrix would be 0 or 
1, and it is called a state vector (space vector) as shown in function (1). 
0 → |0 > →  [
1
0
] ,    or    1 → |1 > →  [
0
1
]  .                                                (1) 
Moreover, BB84 protocol is considered a simple and efficient protocol, where it can be used by 
some devices that are easy to find today. First, Alice chooses a random string of bits, which are 
encoded by a polarization device (Qubit). Then these qubits will be submitted into a quantum 
channel (fiber optics or free space) to Bob sequentially. After that, Bob randomly chooses the 
bases that he wants to measure the upcoming qubits by. Here in this paper, we will not discuss all 
the details about reconciliation or error correction; we just focus on the systematics of each 
protocol in this paper. 
Alice bits 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Alice Bases + × + x + x + + 
Alice states         
         
Bob Bases + × × + × + × + 
Bob State          
Bob Bits 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Table (1). Sending qubits from Alice to Bob in BB84. 
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Several researchers came up with modifications to improve the BB84. For instance, Lo 
introduced in 14 the BB84 that was built in six states instead of four in the original scheme. Also, 
P. Shor announced an algorithm in 23 to improve the quantum reconciliation, of where to factor 
an odd number n, given a method for computing the order of an element. A random number z 
was chosen to find the order rz of z, and then calculates GCD(z
r/2 - 1,n). Shor’s algorithm is 
considered one of the most interested algorithms in quantum key distribution.   
2. B92 Protocol 
C.H. Bennett in 1992 3 announced another QKD protocol that is based upon non-orthogonal 
states. The B92 is similar to the BB84 protocol, and the only difference is that it uses two states 
instead of four states. B92 protocol also was invented based on the Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle that makes B92 unconditionally secure. Furthermore, B92 is a quantum key distribution 
protocol that uses two channels to extract the needed secret key. The first channel is a quantum 
channel that is employed to pass a polarized photons sequentially from Alice to Bob. The second 
channel is a classical channel that usually is used in QKD protocols to sift the qubits and then 
correct the occurred error 7. 
 
Figure (2). The states of photon in B92. 
Here, Alice generates random bits, and she passes each single photon through one of the 
polarization direction. The first direction is a vertical (0) and the second is +45o (1). Bob on the 
other side has analyzers that are oriented in the horizontal direction (1) and -45o (0). Every time 
Bob measures a photon, there is a probability p = 50% of passing the photon through the 
analyzer. After Bob’s measurements, he sends a copy of the measured photons to Alice. Either 
the photons were successfully passed or failed 17. 
Alice bits 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Alice qubits         
         
Bob Bases x + × x + x + + 
Bob Observations          
Bob Bits 0 ? ? 0 1 0 ? ? 
Table (2). Sending qubits from Alice to Bob in B92. 
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Note that Alice records the bit value (0)  or (1) if she submitted |+> or |->, and Bob observes the 
value (0) or (1) if he got |-> or |+> 5. 
3. SARG04 protocol. 
SARG04 was introduced by Valerio Scarani et al. in 21 2004. The SARG04 is known as robust 
QKD protocol against Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attacks. SARG04 and BB84 are 
equivalent in the quantum phase, while the variation is in encoding and decoding of the classical 
information 15. The SARG04 protocol is described in several steps, which starts when Alice 
sends one of the two states in the set to Bob. Next, Bob measures the qubits by choosing one of 
the two bases randomly. After that Alice tells Bob which the state was chosen. Then Alice 
chooses some bits to test them, and Bob estimates the error rate e based on incorrect and correct 
received bits 9. As a conclusion, Eve is not able to obtain information from single photon 
pulses16. 
 
4. Coherent One Way Protocol. 
Coherent One Way Protocol was a solution for weak coherent pulses. As named COW, the 
protocol was presented by Nicolas Gisin et al.10 in 2008. The COW protocol is summarized as 
follows. First, Alice starts sending a large number of time slots that include bit (0) and bit (1) 
with probability equal to (1-f)/2, and the decoy bits will be with probability f. 
 
Figure (3). Coherent One Way Scheme.  
After finishing the exchange of bits, Bob uncovers the bits that were obtained by the detector 
D2M as shown in figure [3]. Next, Alice and Bob agree to remove bits that represent the decoy 
states (bits). Later, Alice estimates the break of coherent by computing the time slots to analyze 
the presence of Eve. At the end, Alice and Bob perform an error correction to end the 
communication with a secret key 25.  
5. EPR Protocol. 
In quantum mechanics, the EPR paradox  is considered the most challenging ideas, which were 
started by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935 6. The EPR protocol argued that quantum 
mechanics is not a complete physical theory. Moreover, the EPR pair is a two-qubit-system 
which is in one of the four Bell states. Bell states are entangled states of two-qubit-system 12. 
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Where |1> and |0> are eigenvectors of Pauli operators. Also, Alice and Bob agree that all the 
states above are encoded as [00, 01, 10 or 11] respectively. There are two legitimate parties, who 
initially share two EPR pair. The protocol is shown as if Alice holds particles (1, 4) and Bob 
holds (2, 3) from |00>1,2 and |00>3,4. Therefore, particles (1, 4) and (2, 3) are not in entangled 
states 13.  
The EPR protocol starts with assigning both Alice and Bob one pair of entangled qubits. Then 
Alice and Bob separately pick a random sequence of bases to measure the particles. After that, 
they measure their qubits in desired basis. Publicly, both Alice and Bob compare the used bases, 
so that they keep just the bits that were measured in same basis. 
Measuring the security and the efficiency of QKD protocols 
The measurements that have been done in this paper are on two sides. The first measurement was 
applied to figure out the Run-Time for each QKD protocol. These protocols were evaluated by 
MATLAB and used QUBIT4MATLAB library. Furthermore, there are critical variations 
between each protocol such as handling the received qubits, measuring qubits in different bases, 
and correcting errors.  
The second measurement is about the security of each studied protocol. The security function 
j(k) has been used to measure each protocol and its security level, where j(k) is equal to the 
natural logarithm with base e ~ 2.71828 of uncovered qubits divided by the length of qubit 
string19.   
 
Figure (4). Shows the run time and the security of BB84 protocol. 
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Figure (5). Shows the run time and the security of B92 protocol. 
 
Figure (6). Shows the run time and the security of SARG04 protocol. 
 
Figure (7). Shows the run time and the security of COW protocol. 
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Figure (8). Shows the run time and the security of EPR protocol. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, several well-known QKD protocols were discussed to demonstrate the weak spots 
in QKD protocols and how they should be handled. Diagnosing these problems helps to modify 
or create QKD protocols that should be more efficient and have ability to stand against QKD 
attacks or the run time of algorithm complexity. The variations that are shown in the previous 
figures prove that there is a clear gap between each one of these protocols; especially in Run- 
Time execution. Each QKD protocol has different run time, which depends on the mechanism of 
handling the qubits. On the other hand, measuring the security of the studied QKD protocols 
demonstrates the rapprochement between these protocols. Finally, the QKD protocols are related 
to the laws of physics in quantum channel, but they are usually different in the classical channel.      
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